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Testimony:   
 
Reforming the Definition of Accredited Investor and Business Development Companies 
 




The federal securities laws were designed to protect investors by ensuring that they had 
adequate disclosure whenever an issuer sold securities.  The private placement exemption is an 
exception to this approach.  These offerings often involve companies with high risk, little 
publicly available information, and illiquid trading markets.  They frequently fail.2   
 
The accredited investor concept seeks to ensure that unregistered investments are sold 
only to persons who can fend for themselves.3  The accredited investor standard currently relies 
on dollar thresholds as an objective substitute for sophistication.  Agreement exists that the 
definition requires reform.  The debate is over how to best ensure that the definition covers 
persons who have the requisite degree of sophistication and excludes those who do not.     
 
With respect to Business Development Companies, these entities play an important role 
in providing funding to “small growing and financially troubled enterprises.”4  Taking steps to 
facilitate the ability of BDCs to better provide financing to these enterprises is an important goal.  
Increasing the leverage limits as proposed in this legislation seems an appropriate method of 
advancing this goal.  Altering the definition of eligible portfolio company, however, raises the 
risk that this much needed source of funding will be redirected away from operating companies, 
reducing the capital available to these businesses.     
  
                                                          
1 Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Secretary, Investor Advisory Committee, 
Securities & Exchange Commission. The IAC has made a recommendation with respect to the definition of 
accredited investor which I support.  Nonetheless, this testimony does reflect my views and does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the IAC or its members.    
2 See Exchange Act Release No. 70741 (Oct. 23, 2013) (“a 2010 study reports that of a random sample of 4,022 new 
high-technology businesses started in 2004, only 68% survived by the end of 2008.  Other studies also have 
documented high failure rates for small newly listed companies. For example, the ten-year delist rate for newly 
listed firms during the period 1981-1991 is 44.1%, compared to 16.9% for newly listed firms in the 1970s.”).   
3 Securities Act Release No. 6683 (Jan. 16, 1987) (“This concept [of accredited investor] is intended to encompass 
those persons whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or ability to fend for 
themselves render the protections of the Securities Act's registration process unnecessary. “).   
4 Investment Company Act Release No. 12274 (March 5, 1982).   









The Commission adopted the test for individuals qualifying as accredited investors in 
1982.5 The rule was an appropriate response to the concerns that existed at the time.  Under the 
reigning case law, private placements were largely limited to sophisticated investors who were 
deemed not to need the protections of the securities laws.6  As a judicially developed doctrine, 
however, sophistication was an amorphous and uncertain concept.7   
   
The Commission responded to the concern by opting for an objective standard in 
determining sophistication.  Accredited investors included anyone with a net worth of $1 million 
or in excess of $200,000 a year in income over a multiple year period.  The SEC understood that 
dollar amounts alone did not always act as an adequate substitute for sophistication. As a result, 
the amounts were deliberately set at very high levels8 in an effort to ensure that most investors 
were likely to be sophisticated or at least wealthy enough to retain the necessary expertise.9   
 
When the definition was originally adopted, a second mechanism existed for ensuring 
that investors purchasing unregistered securities were actually sophisticated.  Private placements 
under Rule 506 could not be sold through general solicitations, largely eliminating indiscriminate 
marketing efforts.  As a result, most investors participating in private placements likely had 
preexisting relationships with, and were known to, their brokers.10  Brokers confronting investors 
                                                          
5 Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities 
Act Release No. 6389 (Mar. 8, 1982). 
6 See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston-Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).  
7 See Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23, 1974) (“The application of these criteria [from Ralston] and other 
guidelines set forth from time to time by the Commission and the courts has resulted in uncertainty about the 
availability of the exemption. In addition, some misconceptions have arisen in connection with certain methods used 
by persons who seek to claim the exemption.”).   
8 Thus, rather than determine the appropriateness of particular types of assets included in the test, the Commission 
actually increased the thresholds from what had been proposed, presumably eliminating the need to make such 
determinations.  See Securities Act Release No. 6389 (March 8, 1982) (“Some commentators, however, 
recommended excluding certain assets such as principal residences and automobiles from the computation of net 
worth. For simplicity, the Commission has determined that it is appropriate to increase the level to $1,000,000 
without exclusions.”).   
9 Approximately 1.8% of families qualified as accredited in 1982.  Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Revisiting the 
"Accredited Investor" Definition to Better Protect Investors, US SEC, Dec. 17, 2014, n. 3, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/spch121714laa.html#_ednref3  The percentage increase to 7.4% by 2010.  See 
Exchange Act Release No. 69959 (July 10, 2013) (“We estimate that at least 8.7 million U.S. households, or 7.4% of 
all U.S. households, qualified as accredited investors in 2010, based on the net worth standard in the definition of 
‘accredited investor’”).  
10 Exchange Act Release No. 69959 (July 10, 2013) (“While we do not know what percentage of investors in Rule 
506 offerings are natural persons, the vast majority of Regulation D offerings are conducted without the use of an 
intermediary, suggesting that many of the investors in Regulation D offerings likely have a pre-existing relationship 
with the issuer or its management because these offerings would not have been conducted using general 
solicitation.”), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf.   
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who met the dollar thresholds under the definition but in fact were not sophisticated were in a 
position to moderate their recommendations accordingly.  
 
The dollar thresholds set out in the original rule have largely remained unchanged for 
more than 30 years.11  At the same time, however, the financial landscape has undergone a 
tectonic shift.   The markets have grown in complexity.  Most significantly, however, has been 
the shift away from pensions to defined contribution plans.  As a result, individuals have needed 
to assume increased responsibility for managing their retirement nest egg.  Defined contribution 
plans have also provided a massive pool of funds for investment.12  As one SEC official put it 
back in 2000, this has caused “a massive movement of middle America into the securities 
markets”.13   
 
Likewise, the number of retirees has undergone sustained growth.  The oldest members 
of the Baby Boom generation celebrated their 65th birthday in 2011.  Every day thereafter 
10,000 baby boomers have reached the age of 65 and will continue to do so until 2030.14  Many 
of these older investors are unsophisticated and “lack even a rudimentary understanding of stock 
and bond prices, risk diversification, portfolio choice, and investment fees.”15   
  
As retirement funds held by individuals have increasingly become available for investing, 
the method of marketing private placements has likewise changed.  With the end to the 
prohibition of general solicitations, individual investors can be solicited through indiscriminate 
forms of mass marketing, including blast emails, ads on the Internet,16 infomercials on cable 
television, or seminars offering inducements such as “free” meals.17  FINRA has issued notices 
about offers involving “pre-IPO shares,”18 high yield investment programs,19 and investment in 
                                                          
11 The thresholds have not changed. The definition with respect to individuals has, however, been amended on 
several occasions.  Most recently, the definition was changed to exclude the value of the primary residence from the 
calculation of net worth.  See Securities Act Release No. 9287 (Dec. 21, 2011).  The definition was also amended in 
1988 to provide that families qualified with an income of $300,000 and to eliminate a test based upon the amount 
invested.  See Securities Act Release No. 6758 (March 3, 1988) (eliminating qualification as accredited where 
investor with $750,000 in net assets purchases at least $150,000 in a single investment).   
12 Assets in defined contribution plans have grown dramatically, going from less than $200 billion in 1980, 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf, to almost $4 trillion in 2014.  See 
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents2013/401k_stats.pdf 
13 https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch369.htm (“In 1980, that number [of American households that invested in a 




16 In re Spectrum Concepts, LLC, Release No. 770 (admin proc April 7, 2015) (information about an offering 
allegedly posted “on a classified advertisement website in order to attract investors broadly.”).    
17 https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/free-lunch-investment-seminars%E2%80%94avoiding-heartburn-hard-sell  
(“In a 2007 report, securities regulators, including FINRA, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and state 
regulators, conducted more than 100 examinations involving free-meal seminars. In half the cases, the sales 
materials—including the invitations and advertisements for the events—contained claims that appeared to be 
exaggerated, misleading or otherwise unwarranted. And 13 percent of the seminars appeared to involve fraud, 
ranging from unfounded projections of returns to sales of fictitious products.”). 
18 https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/pre-ipo-offerings%E2%80%94these-scammers-are-not-your-friends (“For 
instance, in late December 2010, shortly after the Securities and Exchange Commission settled a civil action, federal 
prosecutors brought criminal charges against a self-employed securities trader who allegedly bilked more than 50 
U.S. and foreign investors out of more than $9.6 million in a series of pre-IPO scams spanning an eight-year period. 
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the marijuana business.20  The use of general solicitations increases the likelihood that those 
invited to participate in an unregistered offering will not have a pre-existing relationship with the 
issuer or broker.21 
 
As a practical matter, therefore, private placements are likely to be offered increasingly to 
investors lacking in adequate sophistication and who have, as a primary source of liquidity, funds 
in retirement plans.  The definition of accredited investor should, therefore, take these altered 
dynamics into account.  The definition should not be written to sweep into the category large 
swathes of people who in fact are not sophisticated and are not able to adequately assess the risks 
of the these investments.   
 
 
B. The Direction of Reform 
 
With respect to reform, there is probably more agreement than disagreement.  For one 
thing, the accredited investor definition never made room for persons who were in fact 
sophisticated.  For another, the dollar thresholds, as currently formulated, are not an adequate 
guarantee of accredited investor status.22 There seems to be agreement that, at a minimum, the 
numerical thresholds were arbitrary when determined23 and require reexamination.24    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
We were also aware of other potentially fraudulent schemes that solicited potential victims by purporting to sell 
shares of Facebook.”).  See also SEC v. Premier Links, Inc., Litigation Release No. 23163 (Dec. 19, 2014) 
(allegations that seniors were “cold-called” and subjected to “high-pressure sales tactics to convince seniors to invest 
in companies purportedly on the brink of conducting initial public offerings”).   
19 https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/hyips%E2%80%94high-yield-investment-programs-are-hazardous-your-
investment-portfolio  (“HYIPs use an array of websites and social media—including YouTube, Twitter and 
Facebook—to lure investors, fabricating a ‘buzz’ and creating the illusion of social consensus, which is a common 
persuasion tactic fraudsters use to suggest that ‘everyone is investing in HYIPs, so they must be legitimate.’").      
20 http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/marijuana-stock-scams 
21 Remarks of SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, “The Importance of Small Business Capital Formation”, 33rd 
Annual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, Nov. 20, 2014, Washington, DC, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor33.pdf  (“In addition, the definition of ‘accredited investor’ has 
taken on greater meaning now that issuers can engage, without registration, in unlimited advertising and solicitation, 
so long as the ultimate purchasers are accredited investors. Given the importance of this definition in helping to 
identify investors that are presumably sophisticated and financially able to invest in illiquid securities, the accredited 
investor definition is particularly important.”).   
22 Recommendation of the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee:  Accredited Investor Definition, Oct. 9, 2014 (“IAC 
Recommendation”), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/accredited-
investor-definition-recommendation.pdf  (“the current definition of net worth does not guarantee that the individual 
accredited investor will in fact have sufficient liquid financial assets to ensure either that they can hold the securities 
indefinitely or that they can withstand a significant loss on those investments.”).   
23 See Speech by Michael S. Piwowar, Capital Unbound, Remarks at the Cato Summit on Financial Regulation, NY 
NY, June 2, 2015 (“As the Commission’s Investor Advisory Committee has pointed out, simply adjusting the tests 
for inflation may not be the right answer. We do not know, for instance, if the levels set in 1982 were right to begin 
with. Were they too high or too low? Further, a single national threshold might be both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive at the same time: earning $200,000 a year in rural Iowa is quite different than making $200,000 here in 
New York City.”).   
24 The GAO Report on the definition of accredited investor showed a division among those responding on whether 
the dollar thresholds should be increased.  See Alternative Criteria for Qualifying As An Accredited Investor Should 
be Considered, GAO Report No. 13-640, July 2013.  Objections to an increase often focused on the perceived 




A strong starting place for any reforms should be the recommendations made by the 




Recommendation 1. The Commission should carefully evaluate whether the accredited 
investor definition, as it pertains to natural persons, is effective in identifying a class of 
individuals who do not need the protections afforded by the ’33 Act.  If, as the Committee 
expects, a closer analysis reveals that a significant percentage of individuals who currently 
qualify as accredited investors are not in fact capable of protecting their own interests, the 
Commission should promptly initiate rulemaking to revise the definition to better achieve its 
intended goal. 
 
The Supporting Rationale for the recommendation discussed categories of investors who 
meet the income and net worth thresholds but arguably do not qualify as sophisticated.  
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the appropriate fix is to simply adjust the 
thresholds for inflation.  As the supporting statement noted: 
 
we do not know with any certainty whether the Commission found exactly the right level 
when it set those thresholds originally. It is equally possible that they were set either too 
low or too high to provide the needed investor protections. Moreover, the investing 
population has changed significantly since that time, with a larger percentage of 
unsophisticated, middle income individuals turning to the securities markets to save for 
retirement today than did so 30 years ago. The complexity of financial products, 
including financial products sold through private offerings, has also grown in the 
intervening years. Thus, thresholds that made sense for the investing population of 1982 
may or may not make sense in 2014.  
 
The analysis suggested consideration of alternative approaches that looked to the types of assets 
included in the determination.  In particular, the Supporting Rationale noted that “there may be 
certain types of financial assets, such as retirement accounts, that should not be included in the 
calculation.”    
 
 
Recommendation 2.  The Commission should revise the definition to enable individuals 
to qualify as accredited investors based on their financial sophistication.   
 
The Supporting Statement acknowledged three mechanisms for establishing 
sophistication -- professional credentials, investment experience, and a test of relevant financial 
knowledge.  Credentials that might qualify included the series 7 securities license.  Experience 
might include acting as a professional in the financial industry or private equity sector for a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
simultaneously changed to permit investors to qualify as accredited on the basis of actual sophistication, including 
experience.      
25 IAC Recommendation, supra note 22 (“The Committee does not believe that the current definition as it pertains to 
natural persons effectively serves this function in all instances. “).   
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specified period or actual investment experience.   Finally, testing would need to be sufficiently 
rigorous to “indicate a reasonable level of relevant financial expertise.” 
 
 
Recommendation 3.  If the Commission chooses to continue with an approach that relies 
exclusively or mainly on financial thresholds, the Commission should consider alternative 
approaches to setting such thresholds – in particular limiting investments in private offerings to a 
percentage of assets or income – which could better protect investors without unnecessarily 
shrinking the pool of accredited investors. 
 
As the Supporting Rationale notes, the current definition is essentially an “on/off switch.”  
Once an investor qualifies as accredited, there are no limits on the amount that can be invested.  
On possible approach, therefore, might be to limit the amount of investment as a percentage of 
income or assets.  The restrictions could be reduced or eliminated as assets and income increase.  
 
 
Recommendation 4.  The Commission should take concrete steps to encourage 
development of an alternative means of verifying accredited investor status that shifts the burden 
away from issuers who may, in some cases, be poorly equipped to conduct that verification, 
particularly if the accredited investor definition is made more complex. 
 
 
Recommendation 5.  In addition to any changes to the accredited investor standard, the 
Commission should strengthen the protections that apply when non-accredited individuals, who 
do not otherwise meet the sophistication test for such investors, qualify to invest solely by virtue 
of relying on advice from a purchaser representative. Specifically, the Committee recommends 
that in such circumstances the Commission prohibit individuals who are acting as purchaser 
representatives in a professional capacity from having any personal financial stake in the 
investment being recommended, prohibit such purchaser representatives from accepting direct or 
indirect compensation or payment from the issuer, and require purchaser representatives who are 




* * * 
 
These recommendations suggest that the definition should be reconsidered holistically 
and not in a piecemeal fashion.  Moreover, the holistic approach is more likely to result in an 
outcome that ensures a definition that excludes investors who continue to need the protections of 
the securities laws and ensures that issuers have a greater ability to engage in cost effective 




C. HR 2187 
 
HR 2187 seeks to address some but not all of the current concerns that exist under the 
accredited definition standard.  Significantly, the draft legislation would extend the definition of 
accredited investor to persons who have no demonstrated capacity to absorb the loss should any 
particular investment fail.  As a result, even greater care should be taken to ensure that an 
approach based upon education, experience and testing but without reliance on financial 
thresholds does not accidentally sweep into the definition persons who are in fact not 
sophisticated.     
 
 
1. Automatic Accredited Investor Status 
 
The legislation seeks to provide automatic accredited investor status to any person 
described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 506(c)(2)(ii)(C), irrespective of the income 
and net worth requirements.  The provision specifically lists:  
(1) A registered broker-dealer; 
(2) An investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
(3) A licensed attorney who is in good standing under the laws of the jurisdictions in which 
he or she is admitted to practice law; or 
(4) A certified public accountant who is duly registered and in good standing under the laws 
of the place of his or her residence or principal office.26 
To the extent that the provision is intended to extend accredited investor status to registered 
representatives employed by brokers,27 these individuals generally must pass a Series 7 exam 
issued by FINRA and therefore have some knowledge and background on investments.28 They 
also have continuing education requirements.29  
 
To the extent that the provision is intended to extend accredited investor status to 
investment adviser representatives,30 these individuals generally must have completed a Series 
65 exam.31  As a result, they also generally have some knowledge and background on 
                                                          
26 Rule 506(c)(2)(ii)(C), 17 CFR 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(C).   
27 The bill currently references registered broker-dealers.  Rule 501(a)(1) extends the definition of accredited 
investor to “any broker or dealer registered pursuant to Section 15” of the Exchange Act.  17 CFR 230.501(a)(1).      
28 http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Series_7_Study_Outline.pdf   
29 For brokers, see FINRA Rule 1250, Continuing Education Requirements, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10204    
30 With respect to investment advisers, firms may sometimes register with the SEC but their representatives do not.  
See http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf (“Although many individuals who are 
employed by advisers fall within the definition of ‘investment adviser,’ the SEC generally does not require those 
individuals to register as advisers with the SEC. Instead, the advisory firm must register with the SEC.”). 
31 The exam is the responsibility of NASAA but administered by FINRA.  See 




investments.  They are not, as a result of registration, generally subject to continuing education 
requirements.32    
 
In contrast, the 1,266,158 active lawyers do not possess sufficient indicia of 
sophistication either through education or experience.33   There is nothing inherent in a legal 
education that ensures lawyers will be sophisticated with respect to investments in unregistered 
securities.  Courses at law schools that might provide meaningful understanding of investments 
such as Corporate Finance are not typically required.34  Moreover, even courses such as those 
providing background on the federal securities laws, including the exemptions from registration, 
typically emphasize legal compliance and do emphasize the types of investments available in the 
market or their level of risk.  Nor do lawyers necessarily obtain that expertise as a result of their 
practice area.35  The likelihood that this change will sweep into the definition of accredited a 
large number of investors who in fact are not sophisticated is very high.36   
Finally, the legislation may have unintended harmful consequences.  The legislation 
leaves out other categories of persons likely to be sophisticated.  It does not take into account 
persons who are sophisticated as a result of relevant education or actual experience.  To the 
extent that this legislation was adopted, the incentive by regulators to revise the definition in 




HR 2187 provides that these four categories of persons will be treated as accredited “if 
such person certifies to the issuer prior to the sale of securities” that he or she fits within one of 
the aforementioned categories.   
                                                          
32 http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/exams/exam-faqs/#25 (“There are no continuing education requirements 
for NASAA exams at the present time.”).  The exam only needs to be retaken if there is a two year lapse in 
association with a registered investment adviser.  See http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/exams/exam-faqs/ 
(“When an individual first passes an exam, that person has two years to become licensed (registered) with a state or 
the exam expires. Once registered, the exam remains valid as long as the person stays registered. When a registered 
person’s job is terminated (usually reflected by the filing of a Form U5 by the employer), the state registration 
terminates as well. The individual then has two years to be re-employed and re-registered or the exam will be shown 




cula_2002_2010_executive_summary.authcheckdam.pdf  (“The number of law schools that required courses beyond 
the first year has remained relatively constant since 2002, with Constitutional Law and Evidence garnering the most 
support as required upper division doctrinal courses. For the first time, 28% of law school respondents indicated that 
they required a specific upper division legal writing course.”).   
35 For a demographic break down of lawyers and their employment, see 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_20
12_revised.authcheckdam.pdf 
36 The inclusion of lawyers and CPAs into Rule 506 (c)(2)(ii)(C) was unrelated to investment acumen.  They were 
deemed appropriate categories of persons to verify accredited investor status.  The Commission was not concerned 
with their knowledge of investments but their professional competence and ethical standards.  See Exchange Act 
Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2014) (“in the United States, attorneys and certified public accountants are licensed at 
the state level and are subject to rules of professional conduct”).  Verifying the amount of income or the value of 




The language suggests that issuers will only need to obtain the requisite certification 
without having to undertake additional verification.  To the extent true, the language arguably 
overturns the provision in the JOBS Act that requires issuers to take “reasonable steps” to ensure 
accredited investor status.   
 
Nor does self-certification ensure that investors are in fact registered representatives, 
investment adviser representatives, lawyers, or CPAs.  There are a number of reasons why 
individuals might incorrectly certify their status.  They may be mistaken about their current 
status.  Investors may misrepresent their status in order to participate in what looks like an 
attractive offer. 37 They may also do so at the instigation of a third party 38 or as a result of 
fabrication by a third party.39     
 
It should also be noted that at least for some of the categories referenced in the 
legislation, verification is not difficult. The status of registered representatives and investment 
adviser representatives can be easily ascertained in existing and accessible data bases.40 
 
 
3. Retention and Use of Services 
 
HR 2187 would also permit persons to certify that they have retained a broker, adviser, 
attorney or CPA and “used the services . . . to make an investment decision relative to the 
securities being offered”.   This provision allows unsophisticated investors to qualify as 
accredited simply by retaining a professional and using the professional’s services in connection 
with the investment.  The language, however, raises a number of concerns.     
 
First, the language of the provision is unclear.  It does not explicitly provide that the 
professional must have been retained to provide investment advice with respect to a particular 
security.  A lawyer providing estate planning or a CPA reviewing a tax return could provide 
“services” related to an investment without actually providing investment advice.     
 
                                                          
37 See Markup of H.R. 2940, Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, Subcommittee on Capital Markets and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, House Financial Services Committee, 112th Cong. (Oct. 5, 2011) (remarks of 
Representative Waters)  (Nov. 3, 2011) (“there will be no reason to believe that any investor seduced by public 
advertising will hesitate to be dishonest with completing the investor suitability questionnaire”).   
38 See In re Sabado, Securities Act Release No. 9238 (July 14, 2011) (allegations broker “instructed” investor to 
represent himself as accredited “when he was not.”) 
39 See In re Bettiga, Securities Act Release No. 7553 (admin proc. July 9, 1998)  (allegations subscription 
agreements falsified “in order to qualify [investors] as accredited investors by adding a fictitious asset to their 
financial information.”); In re Kaechelle, Securities Act Release No. 7148 (March 8, 1995) (allegations that 
employee “permitted . . . salesmen and other employees to fabricate investor accreditation information”); In re 
Henry, Exchange Act Release No. 40183 (admin proc July 9, 1998) (allegations that by “falsifying the customers 
'net worth’ on these documents, the two registered representatives . . . qualified non-accredited investors as 
accredited investors.”); In re Dominion Capital Corp.,  Securities Act Release No. 7683 (admin proc May 13, 1999) 
(allegations that “representatives submitted false, inflated statements of customers' net worth on new account forms 
and subscription agreements . . . in order to qualify numerous customers  to purchase these LLC interests. “). 




Second, the provision does not include a requirement that the professionals have any 
particular understanding or knowledge with respect to the investment at issue.   
 
Third, the provision does not include any disqualifications for market professionals who 
have been determined to be bad actors.41  
 
Fourth, the provision relies on self-certification by the investor.  As discussed above, 
such information may be inaccurate.  Moreover, an investor may not have been correctly 
informed as to the status of the person offering the financial product.42      
 
Fifth, under the language, customers of brokers and advisers may become accredited 
simply as a result of receipt of investment recommendations.  This would arguably be the case 
even where the broker or adviser knew that the investor lacked the sophistication needed to 
understand the investment.     
 
Sixth, the provision does not include any prophylactic safeguards designed to ensure that 
investors are adequately protected in their relationship with the relevant professional.  The 
definition of Purchaser Representative in Rule 501 requires that the representative have sufficient 
knowledge and experience about the prospective investment.  There must be a written 
acknowledgement of a representative’s status.  Purchaser representatives must disclose certain 
conflicts of interest.  None of these safeguards are required in the current draft.     
 
Finally, the categories included in the legislation provide investors with different types of 
duties.  Brokers, for example, are subject to suitability requirements while advisers have 
fiduciary duties.  In the context of the sale of unregistered shares, individuals obtaining 
accredited status solely as a result of a recommendation from a retained market professional 
should receive a consistent and high standard of care.  Such professionals should, therefore, be 




HR 2187 would require the SEC to establish criteria for the use by FINRA “in 
administering an exam to license as accredited investors natural persons who don’t meet the 
income and net worth requirements”.  The criteria “may include methods for assuring that 
                                                          
41 See Rule 506(d), 17 CFR 230.506(d) (defining bad actor standards).   
42 SEC v. Dodge, Litigation Release No. 21759 (WD TX Dec. 1, 2010)  (allegations in the complaint that individual 
“misrepresented that he was a licensed securities broker and that he had verified the validity of the Private 
Placement program.”); SEC v. Clifford, Litigation Release No. 20622 (D. Mass. June 18, 2008)  (allegations in the 
complaint that individual misrepresented that he was a “registered investment advisor[]” and was ”affiliated with a 
particular registered investment adviser/broker-dealer when he was not”); In re Robert A. Tommassello, Exchange 
Act Release No. 51587 (admin proc. April 21, 2005) (allegations that individual “misrepresented to investors [that 
corporation was] a registered investment adviser.’”).   See also https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/cold-calls-
brokerage-firm-imposters%E2%80%94beware-old-fashioned-phishing (“Recently, FINRA has received reports that 
scamsters are posing as employees of at least one well-known brokerage firm to obtain personal information. In a 
new twist to Internet "phishing schemes," which use spam email to lure you into revealing everything from Social 
Security numbers to financial account information, it appears that some fraudsters may be resorting to a time-tested 
method—the telephone call.”).   
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licensed accredited investors demonstrate a competency in understanding” including the 
following: 
 
A. The different types of securities. 
B. The disclosure obligations under the securities laws of issuers versus private companies. 
C. The structures of corporate governance. 
D. The components of a financial statement. 
E. Other criteria the Commission shall establish in the public interest and for the protection 
of investors. 
 
Testing is an appropriate method of determining sophistication.  The test needs to be 
thorough and robust and administered by the proper agency or entity.43  It also needs to have a 
temporal component that requires retesting or at least additional testing after a defined period of 
time.  An investor who passes the test at age 25 may not have an adequate understanding of the 
risks associate with the market 50 years later. 
 
The list of tested factors should also be expanded.  Other possible topics include: (1) 
market structure, such as the role of brokers, advisers and other financial professionals (2) the 
principal factors affecting securities markets and prices, whether bonds or equities; (3) an 
understanding of primary and secondary offerings, including restrictions on resales and 
consequences of illiquidity; (4) the traditional risk profile for particular types off investors, 
particularly those with retirement plans and other tax advantaged accounts; (5) an understanding 
of collective investment vehicles such as closed end funds, real estate investment trusts, hedge 
funds, and, blind pool/ blank check companies; and (6) the common factors that suggest a 
heightened risk of securities fraud.   
 
 
D. The Ongoing Process  
 
As required by Section 413 of Dodd-Frank,44 the staff at the Commission is working on a 
study of the definition of accredited investor with respect to individuals with the goal of 
determining whether adjustments should be made.45  Changes must be “appropriate for the 
protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.”  Commentators have 
had a chance to weigh in the process and provide their views.46   
 
The staff likely has under review all aspects of the definition, including both the dollar 
thresholds and the need to add categories of individuals who are sophisticated in fact.  The SEC 
                                                          
43 FINRA has experience administering tests to market professionals rather than investors.  
44 See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Rel. No. 9287, at 5-6 (Dec. 21, 20 II) ("Section 
413(b) specifically authorizes us to undertake a review of the definition of the term 'accredited investor' as it applies 
to natural persons, and requires us to undertake a review of the definition in its entirety every four years, beginning 
four years after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. We are also authorized to engage in rulemaking to make 
adjustments to the definition after each such review."), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9287.pdf 
45 Speech by Commissioner Piwowar, supra (“I welcome this review, and am pleased that staff in our Division of 
Corporation Finance is currently working on the study.”) 




is, therefore, in a position to engage in a holistic, thoughtful reevaluation of the definition that 
takes in to account all of the competing interests.  The results will presumably be made public 
and presumably generate proposals for reform of the accredited investor definition. Any 




II. Business Development Companies 
 
Business development companies were created to “make capital more readily available to 
small developing and financially troubled businesses.”47  To accomplish this task, BDCs can 
only invest 70% of total assets in securities of certain types of companies (“eligible portfolio 
companies”).  Excluded from this definition are investment companies and companies set out in 
Section 3(c) of the 1940 Act.48 
 
Among other things, proposed revisions would reduce the asset coverage for senior 
securities representing indebtedness from 200% to 150%, permit multiple classes of preferred 
shares, and alter the definition of eligible portfolio company to permit an increase in investments 
in non-operating companies.  Finally, discussion has occurred over the authority of commercial 
banks to sponsor BDCs under the Volcker Rule.49 
 
Some of the proposed revisions, such as the reduction in the asset coverage for senior 
securities, appear to be appropriate reforms designed to allow BDCs to have some additional 
capacity to raise funds.  Such a change will potentially increase the risks associated with a BDC.  
Nonetheless, this is one area where adequate disclosure to investors appears to be a reasonable 
method of addressing the concern.  In addition, the draft legislative proposal provides investors 
with an opportunity to exit the company before the new limits become applicable. 
 
The draft legislative proposal would also allow for the issuance of multiple classes of 
preferred shares.  In doing so, the proposal would eliminate a number of investor protections 
currently in the statute.  These include the right of preferred shares to elect at least two directors 
or, in some cases, the entire board.  Likewise, the legislation would eliminate the right of 
shareholders to approve a reorganization that adversely affected such securities.  The provision 
also provides that preferred shares need not have voting rights or equal voting rights.   
 
The elimination of these protections is ameliorated by a provision in the current draft that 
provides that changes shall not apply to stock “issued to a person who is not known by the 
company to be a qualified institutional buyer”.  The provision therefore ensures that only very 
sophisticated purchasers will acquires these shares from the BDC.  It should be noted, however, 
                                                          
47 Investment Company Act Release No. 27538 (Oct. 25, 2006).   
48 Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company Act of 1940; see also Section 3(c) of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940.   
49 Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge 
Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5675 (Jan. 31, 2014) (“The Agencies do not believe it would be 
appropriate to treat as a covered fund registered investment companies and business development companies, which 
are regulated by the SEC as investment companies.”).   
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that the provision appears to be limited to shares issued by the BDC and does not appear to apply 
to resales.   
 
The provision does, however, provide discretion that at least in some cases can 
disadvantage the common stockholders.  By eliminating the need for voting rights or “equal 
voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock” the provision does not prohibit super-
voting shares (shares with more than one vote per share).50  A BDC could conceivably issue a 
new class of preferred shares that transfers voting control to the owners of that class.  Moreover, 
new classes or series of preferred shares can typically be issued by the board of directors, 
without shareholder approval.51  Perhaps the provision could be changed to provide that the 
provisions of Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act would only be inapplicable with respect to voting 
rights to the extent that voting rights are equal to or less than the voting rights of the common 
shares.    
 
Perhaps the most serious concern posed by this draft legislation is the proposed change in 
the definition of eligible portfolio company.  The legislation would allow BDCs to increase the 
percentage of assets that can be invested in financial firms.  When adopted in 1980, Congress 
deliberately sought to increase funding to operating companies rather than financial firms.52  The 
purpose was to protect a class of companies considered critical to the US economy.  As the 
House Report stated: 
 
The Committee is well aware of the slowing of the flow of capital to American 
enterprise, particularly to smaller, growing businesses, that has occurred in recent years. 
The importance of these businesses to the American economic system in terms of 
innovation, productivity, increased competition and the jobs they create is, of course, 
critical. Hence, the need to reverse this downward trend is of compelling public concern. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).  Congress sought to provide assistance both 
by increasing the amount of capital available to eligible operating companies and by requiring 
that the BDCs offer them “significant managerial assistance.”53   
 
 Changing the definition of eligible portfolio company to permit increased investment in 
financial firms may result in a reduction in the funds available to operating companies.  It may 
also result in an increase in the cost of funds to operating companies.  To the extent that 
                                                          
50 Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act.   
51 The authority to do so is commonly found in the articles.  For an example of this authority, see GOLDMAN 
SACHS BDC, INC., Article IV, Certificate of Incorporation, available at  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1572694/000119312515074210/d838148dex99a.htm 
52 See Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, HR Rep. No. 96-1341, 96th Congress, 2d Sess. 29 (“This 
requirement ensures that the business development company will invest in operating companies rather than investing 
in other financial institutions. For example, an eligible portfolio company could not be a broker, bank or insurance 
company.”); see also id. at 61 (“Unlike most registered investment companies, business development companies 
frequently have control of the operating companies in which they invest. This section makes clear that control, in 
and of itself, does not serve to bring those operating companies within the purview of the Investment Company 
Act.”).  
53 15 USC 80a-2(a)(47).  This can include any arrangement whereby the BDC provides “significant guidance and 
counsel concerning the management, operations, or business objectives and policies of a portfolio company”.  Id. 
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operating companies incur a reduction in financing from BDCs, they will also not benefit from 
the obligation to provide significant managerial assistance.   
With respect to the decision by commercial banks to form BDCs, this has the capacity to 
impact the market occupied by BDCs.  Even with a limit in the number of shares that a 
commercial bank is likely to own,54 the market may perceive the credit of a bank sponsored BDC 
as superior to at least some of the other BDCs, perhaps even as implicitly guaranteed.  Any 
funding advantage could, as a result, allow bank sponsored BDCs to increase their market 
share.55   
 
                                                          
54 To avoid treating the BDC as an affiliate, banks may not “own, control, or hold with the power to vote 25 percent 
or more of the voting shares” of a BDC.  See 12 CFR §248.12(b) Permitted investment in a covered fund 
55 For an article addressing the competitive advantages of commercial banks in other contexts, see J. Robert Brown, 
Jr., The "Great Fall": The Consequences of Repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, 2 Stanford J. L., Bus. & Fin. 129 
(1995), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961634 
 
